Sudanese Alliance for Rights

التحالف السودا للحقوق

THE MILITARISATION OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN NORTH KORDOFAN

PATTERNS, IMPLICATIONS AND THE IMPACT ON CIVILIANS



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List of Acronyms

SAR:	Sudanese Alliance for Rights.
SA:	Sudanese Armed Forces.
RSF:	Rapid Support Forces.
IHL:	International Humanitarian Law.
ICRC:	International Committee of the Red Cross.
ICC:	International Criminal Court.
IOM:	International Organization for Migration.
UN:	United Nations.
AP II:	Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
AP I:	Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
NIAC:	Non-International Armed Conflict.
OSINT:	Open-Source Intelligence.
GIS:	Geographic Information System.
GPS:	Global Positioning System.
UXO:	Unexploded Ordnance.
IDPs:	Internally Displaced Persons.
IHRL:	International Human Rights Law.
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council.
EO:	El Obeid.
JF:	Joint Forces.
LOAC:	Law of Armed Conflict.
CVR:	Civilian Harm Verification and Recording.
C2:	Command and Control.
EOI:	Evidence of Incident.
BDA:	Battle Damage Assessment.
PPE:	Personal Protective Equipment.
SIGINT:	Signals Intelligence.
EW:	Electronic Warfare.



Table of Contents

Executive Summary 01-02

1. Introduction 03

- 1.1 Background to the Conflict in Sudan 03
- 1.2 Civilian Infrastructure in the Context of the War 03
- 1.3 Purpose and Scope of the Report 04
- 1.4 Methodology and Sources 04

2. Militarisation of Civilian Infrastructure in North Kordofan 05

- 2.1 Overview of the emerging pattern 05
- 2.2 Conversion of civilian facilities into military headquarters 06
- 2.3 Military Objectives in Populated Areas 07

3. Timeline of Documented Incidents (2025–2026) 08

4. Civilian Infrastructure Converted or Used for Military Purposes 11

- 4.1 Olympic Stadium, El Obeid 11
- 4.2 Al Qubba Primary School, El Obeid 12
- 4.3 Al Qadaiya (Judiciary) Hotel, El Obeid 14
- 4.4 Social Security Hospital, El Obeid 14
- 4.5 Security and Intelligence Service Complex (Station 13), Al Wohda 15
- 4.6 Fifth Infantry Division and Surrounding Civilian Areas 15
- 4.7 Um Rawaba City Court Complex 16

5. International Humanitarian Law and Protection of Civilian Infrastructure 17

- 5.1 Applicable Legal Framework 17
- 5.2 Civilian Objects and Military Objectives 18
- 5.3 Distinction, Proportionality and Precautions 19
- 5.4 Special Protection of Medical and Educational Facilities 19

6. Legal Implications of Military Use of Civilian Infrastructure 21

- 6.1 Loss of Protection and Military Objectives 22
- 6.2 Legal Assessment of Military Headquarters, Weapons Storage and Accommodation 23 23
- 6.3 Potential Criminal Responsibility 23

7. Responsibility of Parties to the Conflict 24

- 7.1 Responsibility for Militarisation of Civilian Facilities 24
- 7.2 Responsibility for Attacks 25
- 7.3 Command Responsibility and Accountability 26

8. Impact on Civilians and Civilian Life 27

- 8.1 Deaths, Injuries and Displacement 27
- 8.2 Damage to Homes and Civilian Infrastructure 27
- 8.3 Effects on Education, Healthcare and Justice 28
- 8.4 Humanitarian Consequences 29

9. Accountability and Documentation Priorities 30-32

10. Conclusion 33-34

11. Recommendations 35-37

12. Annexes 38-40



i. Executive **Summary**

Since the outbreak of Sudan's armed conflict on 15 April 2023, civilians have faced widespread violence, loss of life, displacement, and the destruction of essential infrastructure. While the full death toll remains difficult to verify, the scale of displacement is well documented. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 15 million people have been displaced since the conflict began, with approximately 6.4 million remaining internally displaced as of October 2026.
In North Kordofan State, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and allied groups has exposed civilians and civilian infrastructure to significant risks. This report by the Sudanese Alliance for Rights (SAR) examines documented cases in which civilian facilities were reportedly occupied, converted, or used for military purposes, and analyzes the implications of these practices under international humanitarian law (IHL).

SAR's findings, based on field documentation, open-source investigations, and publicly available information, indicate that the militarisation of civilian infrastructure was documented in North Kordofan by at least 2025 and continued throughout 2026.

Reported cases include the conversion of Al Qubba Primary School in El Obeid into a military headquarters, accommodation facility, and weapons storage site, as well as the use of the Olympic Stadium in El Obeid as a Joint Forces headquarters, military accommodation center, and ammunition depot for more than one and a half years before it was reportedly targeted in September 2026.

Additional documented incidents include the reported accommodation of senior Joint Forces commanders at Al Qadaiya Hotel, allegations that senior military officials used the basement of the Social Security Hospital, the use of Station 13 in Al-Wohda as an RSF base, military activities within the Um Rawaba City Court Complex, and military operations conducted near civilian neighborhoods surrounding the Fifth Infantry Division.

The documented facilities represent a wide range of civilian infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, courts, sports facilities, hotels, and administrative buildings. Their reported military use included command and control functions, accommodation of fighters, storage of weapons and ammunition, training activities, military ceremonies, and communications or electronic warfare equipment.

These cases demonstrate that militarisation extended across multiple categories of civilian infrastructure rather than being confined to a single type of facility.

The report highlights the serious risks that arise when military activities are conducted within civilian environments. Schools used as military bases remain surrounded by residential communities. Hospitals allegedly used by military personnel continue to serve patients. Courts can remain operational while hosting military activities. Such practices may place civilians at increased risk of attack and expose surrounding neighborhoods to damage, casualties, fear, and displacement.

Several documented incidents illustrate these consequences. In September 2026, an RSF drone reportedly struck the Olympic Stadium, hitting a weapons depot and causing secondary explosions that damaged nearby homes and Shikan Medical College. Similarly, a September 2025 strike on Al Qubba Primary School reportedly triggered explosions in a weapons storage area, damaging surrounding homes and causing residents to flee. In Um Rawaba, a drone strike on the City Court Complex reportedly killed 13 civilians and injured 31 after military activities had reportedly taken place within the facility.

The report emphasizes that the use of civilian infrastructure for military purposes does not automatically constitute a war crime, just as attacks against militarised civilian facilities are not automatically lawful. Each incident must be assessed individually under international humanitarian law. Civilian objects remain protected unless they become military objectives by making an effective contribution to military action and offering a definite military advantage if neutralized.

The report therefore identifies a dual responsibility. The party using civilian infrastructure for military purposes may expose civilians to foreseeable harm and violate IHL obligations, while the attacking party must independently comply with its legal obligations regardless of the conduct of its adversary. Violations by one party do not justify violations by another.

SAR calls on all parties to cease using civilian infrastructure for military purposes wherever feasible, particularly schools, hospitals, courts, and other essential public facilities. The report further calls for the removal of military personnel, weapons, and ammunition from civilian sites, the relocation of military objectives away from populated areas where possible, and the independent investigation of both militarisation practices and attacks affecting such facilities.

The available evidence establishes that the militarisation of civilian infrastructure in North Kordofan was occurring by 2025 and continued through 2026. Further investigation is required to determine the full extent of these practices, identify individual and command responsibility for violations, and assess whether similar patterns are occurring elsewhere in Sudan.



1. Introduction

Background to the Conflict in Sudan

Sudan has been experiencing a non-international armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces and their respective allied forces since 15 April 2023.

The conflict has affected large parts of the country and has increasingly involved fighting in and around urban and populated areas. Military facilities, checkpoints, command positions, and weapons storage sites may be located close to residential neighborhoods, markets, schools, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure.

This proximity has created an acute protection challenge. Civilians may remain in areas containing military objectives because they live there, work there, depend on nearby services, or lack safe routes to leave. The incorporation of civilian infrastructure into military activities further complicates the protection of civilians and civilian objects.

Civilian Infrastructure in the Context of the War

Civilian infrastructure includes the physical facilities through which communities live, work, and access essential services. This includes schools, hospitals, courts, markets, sports facilities, hotels, places of worship, water infrastructure, residential buildings and other facilities serving civilian purposes.

The source material reviewed for this report demonstrates that some civilian facilities have reportedly been incorporated into military activities. In the documented cases, facilities have reportedly been used as military headquarters, accommodation for personnel, weapons and ammunition storage and training sites for military equipment.



The concern is not simply that civilian infrastructure may be damaged during attacks. The militarisation of such infrastructure can alter the circumstances in which attacks take place and can increase the foreseeable risk to civilians who live, work or receive services around the facility.

Purpose and Scope of the Report

This report examines the documented use, occupation and conversion of civilian infrastructure for military purposes in North Kordofan State during Sudan's ongoing armed conflict.

It seeks to establish four principal issues.

- Identifying the documented pattern of civilian infrastructure being used for military purposes in North Kordofan.
- Examining the legal implications of that use under international humanitarian law.
- Considering the respective obligations and potential responsibilities of parties that use civilian infrastructure for military purposes and parties that subsequently attack such facilities.
- Documenting the impact of militarisation on civilians, civilian objects and essential civilian services.

The report does not conclude that every reported case constitutes a war crime. Instead, it provides a framework for assessing the legal significance of each incident according to the available evidence.

Methodology and Sources

This report is based on field research conducted by the Sudanese Alliance for Rights (SAR), supported by open-source investigations, incident reports, and publicly available information. It examines selected incidents in North Kordofan State, particularly in El Obeid and Um Rawaba, as well as other documented locations.

The documentation process focused on the civilian function of facilities, allegations of military use, the presence of military personnel or weapons, and attacks on or near these sites. It also assessed civilian casualties, property damage, displacement, and disruptions to essential services. Open-source investigations supplemented the analysis of reported incidents and their impact on surrounding communities.

Information was assessed based on source credibility, consistency of accounts, and the availability of corroborating evidence. Where possible, reported information was cross-checked against other sources. The report distinguishes between documented findings, reported allegations, and matters requiring further verification, recognizing that the strength of evidence varies across incidents.

The report also applies relevant international humanitarian law, including treaty provisions and the ICRC database on customary international humanitarian law, to evaluate the legal implications of documented cases. Some allegations, notably the reported military use of the Social Security Hospital, remain unverified and require further independent investigation. Findings and legal assessments are therefore presented according to the quality and strength of the available evidence.



2. The Militarisation of Civilian Infrastructure in Sudan: Documented Patterns

Overview of the Emerging Pattern

The evidence reviewed indicates that civilian infrastructure has been drawn into military activities in several ways.

The documented cases involve facilities that were originally established for civilian purposes but were reportedly subsequently occupied, converted, or partially used by armed actors.

The facilities identified include a sports stadium, a primary school, a hotel belonging to the Judicial Authority, a hospital, a Security and Intelligence Service complex, a court complex, and civilian areas surrounding an established military division.

The military uses reported include headquarters, accommodation, weapons and ammunition storage, military training, military ceremonies, and communications or electronic equipment. This creates a recurring protection problem: civilian communities remain physically and functionally connected to facilities that have acquired a military role.

Conversion of Civilian Facilities into Military Headquarters

Several documented cases involve the reported conversion of civilian or mixed-use facilities into military headquarters.

The Olympic Stadium was reportedly used as a Joint Forces headquarters. Al Qubba Primary School was reportedly taken over by the Al Baraa Ibn Malik Brigades as a headquarters. Station 13 reportedly became an RSF base and headquarters. The Social Security Hospital is alleged to have served as a headquarters for senior military officials, although that information remains unverified.

The use of a civilian building as a headquarters can be legally significant because command-and-control functions may directly contribute to military operations. However, the precise legal assessment depends on the nature of the command function, the duration of use, the operational significance of the facility, and whether its destruction, capture, or neutralization would offer a definite military advantage.

Use of Civilian Facilities for Weapons and Ammunition Storage

The storage of weapons and ammunition in civilian facilities presents particularly serious risks.
At the Olympic Stadium, the documentation reports the presence of a weapons and ammunition storage facility. At Al Qubba Primary School, one classroom was reportedly used as a depot for weapons and ammunition.

The placement of ammunition inside civilian infrastructure creates the possibility of secondary explosions and can substantially increase the area affected by an attack. It may also transform a facility that would otherwise be protected into a military objective where the legal criteria are satisfied.

The Olympic Stadium attack demonstrates this risk. The reported strike hit the weapons and ammunition storage facility and caused explosions lasting for several hours, damaging surrounding homes and Shikan Medical College.

Use of Civilian Facilities for Military Accommodation and Training

Civilian infrastructure has also reportedly been used to accommodate military personnel.
The Olympic Stadium was reportedly used to accommodate Joint Forces personnel. At Al Qubba Primary School, several classrooms were reportedly used to accommodate soldiers. At Al Qadaiya Hotel, several suites were reportedly allocated to senior Joint Forces commanders on a semi-permanent basis.

Accommodation alone may require a different legal assessment from the storage of ammunition or the operation of a command centre. The assessment should establish whether the accommodation contributed to military action in the circumstances and whether its destruction, capture or neutralisation offered a definite military advantage. The duration and scale of the military presence are therefore important.

Military Communications and Electronic Equipment

The Um Rawaba City Court Complex is particularly significant because the source material reports the presence of a powerful jamming device inside the complex.

Electronic warfare and communications equipment can contribute directly to military operations. However, the legal assessment must establish the nature, operational purpose, and actual use of the equipment.

It must also establish whether the equipment was located within the court complex at the time of the attack, whether military personnel were present, whether the facility continued to perform its civilian judicial functions, and what information the attacking party possessed about these circumstances.

Military Activities in and Around Civilian Institutions

The evidence also demonstrates that militarisation does not always involve the complete conversion of a facility.

The Um Rawaba Court Complex reportedly continued functioning as a court while hosting a military graduation ceremony. The Social Security Hospital reportedly continued serving patients despite allegations that senior military officials used its basement. Al Qadaiya Hotel remained a civilian investment of the Judicial Authority while reportedly providing semi-permanent accommodation to senior commanders.

These examples demonstrate the importance of examining the precise nature and extent of military use rather than treating an entire facility as automatically converted.

Military Objectives in or Near Densely Populated Areas

A related concern involves military facilities located within or near civilian neighbourhoods. The Fifth Infantry Division and Station 13 illustrate how military bases in populated areas can expose civilians to the effects of conflict. Reports indicate that nearby residents suffered deaths, injuries, displacement, and damage to homes, shops, and fuel stations during fighting. Under customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL), parties should, where feasible, avoid placing military objectives in densely populated areas and remove civilians and civilian objects from their vicinity.



3. Timeline of Documented Incidents

2025: Early Documented Cases

The available evidence indicates that civilian infrastructure was already being used for military purposes by 2025.

At the beginning of 2025, Al Qubba Primary School was reportedly taken over by the Al Baraa Ibn Malik Brigades. The school was reportedly used as a headquarters, with one classroom serving as a weapons and ammunition storage depot and other classrooms being used to accommodate soldiers.

In September 2025, the school was reportedly targeted by an RSF drone. The strike hit the weapons and ammunition storage area, causing explosions, damage to civilian homes, and fear among residents. The source reports that many residents subsequently left the neighbourhood.

The Olympic Stadium was reportedly used for military purposes for more than one and a half years before its reported targeting in September 2026, placing the start of its military use around 2025 or earlier. The precise date of conversion should nevertheless be independently established.

2026: Continued and Expanded Militarisation

During 2026, the documented cases expanded to include additional types of civilian infrastructure.

Al Qadaiya Hotel was reportedly being used to accommodate senior Joint Forces commanders. The Social Security Hospital was reportedly being used by senior military officials, although this allegation remains unverified. Station 13 was reportedly being used as an RSF military base. The Um Rawaba Court Complex reportedly hosted military personnel and equipment while continuing to function as a civilian judicial institution.
These cases demonstrate that the reported practice was not confined to schools or sports facilities.



هجوم بالمسيرات على الأبيض.. ونزوح 1650 شخصًا من الفاشر خلال يومين

استهدفت قوات الدعم السريع صباح اليوم مواقع تابعة لكتائب البراء بن مالك داخل الأبيض، ما أدى إلى مقتل أكثر من 70 شخصا وتدمير مخزن للذخيرة.

Dabanga Radio TV Online | Sep 25, 2025

Radio Dabanga "A protest march targeted El Obeid, and 1,650 people were displaced from El Fasher in two days." September 25, 2025

https://www.dabangasudan.org/ar/all-news/article/%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD-1650-%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8B#google_vignette Accessed date November 10, 2026.

August and September 2026: Attacks Affecting Militarised Civilian Facilities

On 12 August 2026, El Obeid was reportedly targeted by four to five RSF drones. One reportedly struck an area east of Al Qadaiya Hotel. Shrapnel reportedly killed a woman at the Agricultural Bank and Judicial Authority employee Ahmed Salah. The incident reportedly resulted in the suspension of Judicial Authority activities, the closure of some schools, and the closure of the main market.

On 8 September 2026, an RSF drone reportedly struck the Um Rawaba City Court Complex after a military graduation ceremony had taken place there. The incident reportedly killed 13 civilians and injured 31 others.

On 28 September 2026, an RSF drone reportedly struck the Olympic Stadium in El Obeid. The strike reportedly hit a weapons and ammunition storage facility, causing explosions that continued for several hours. Nearby homes were reportedly damaged and Shikan Medical College partially damaged.

What the Timeline Reveals

The timeline suggests continuity rather than a single isolated incident.
The documented cases begin at least in 2025 and continue through 2026. They also show different forms of military use, from complete occupation and headquarters functions to partial use of civilian facilities and temporary military activities.

The timeline further demonstrates that militarisation can have consequences even when the militarised facility itself is not directly struck. Military positions within civilian areas can increase the likelihood that nearby civilian buildings, services and populations will be affected by attacks.



4. Case Studies: Civilian Infrastructure Converted or Used for Military Purposes

Olympic Stadium, El Obeid

The Olympic Stadium was originally a civilian sports facility consisting of offices, sports fields, and spectator stands. It served as a youth training centre and was located near residential neighbourhoods and Shikan Medical College.

According to the documentation reviewed, the stadium was used for more than 1.5 years as the headquarters of the Joint Forces. It was also reportedly used for military activities, personnel accommodation, and weapons and ammunition storage.
On 28 September 2026, at approximately 1:00 am, the stadium was reportedly targeted by RSF drones. One drone reportedly struck a weapons and ammunition storage facility inside the stadium. The resulting explosions reportedly continued until approximately 4:00 am.

The explosions reportedly caused panic among residents. Nearby homes sustained cracks, and Shikan Medical College was partially damaged. No civilian deaths or injuries were reported in the source material.

The case illustrates the consequences of storing ammunition in a civilian environment. The military use of the stadium may have exposed civilians to foreseeable danger, while the attacking party remained required to assess the likely effects of the attack, including secondary explosions and damage to surrounding civilian objects.

Al Qubba Primary School, El Obeid

Al Qubba Primary School is located in the Al Qubba neighbourhood of El Obeid and was built within a residential area to provide education close to students' homes. Residential buildings surround the school.

At the beginning of 2025, the school was reportedly taken over by the Al Baraa Ibn Malik Brigades as their headquarters. One classroom was reportedly used to store weapons and ammunition, while several other classrooms were reportedly used to accommodate soldiers.

The use of a school in this manner creates serious protection concerns. It can deprive children of access to education while introducing weapons and armed personnel into a civilian environment.

In September 2025, the school was reportedly targeted by an RSF drone. The strike struck the weapons and ammunition depot, causing explosions in the middle of the neighborhood.

Although no deaths or injuries were reportedly recorded, several civilian homes were partially damaged. The incident caused fear and panic and reportedly prompted residents to leave the neighbourhood.

The case demonstrates why the legal assessment must examine both sides. The military use of the school may have exposed the facility and surrounding population to foreseeable danger. At the same time, the attacking party remained bound by the rules governing distinction, proportionality and precautions.



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/ Sep 30 /

[1] December News “Rapid Support Forces drones target weapons stored at the Olympic Stadium in Al-Abyad” October 1, 2026

https://decembernews.com/archives/8633, Accessed date November 10, 2026.

Al Qadaiya (Judiciary) Hotel, El Obeid

Al Qadaiya Hotel is reportedly an investment of the Judicial Authority of North Kordofan State. The six-story building is located near the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal and in proximity to other civilian institutions and businesses, including the Agricultural Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank, and Al Romani Supermarket.

Several suites were reportedly allocated to senior Joint Forces commanders who stayed there on a semi-permanent basis.

The use of a civilian hotel for military accommodation raises questions about the facility's status and the risks posed to surrounding civilians. Further investigation is needed to establish whether military operations were planned or directed from the hotel, whether weapons or equipment were stored there, the duration of the military presence, and whether the hotel's use contributed to military action in a manner that satisfies the legal test for a military objective.

On 12 August 2026, El Obeid was reportedly targeted by four to five RSF drones. One drone reportedly struck an area east of the hotel, scattering shrapnel. A woman who had gone to the Agricultural Bank to collect her pension was reportedly killed, as was Judicial Authority employee Ahmed Salah. Judicial Authority activities were suspended, some schools were closed, and the main market was reportedly shut.

The incident illustrates how the consequences of military activity can extend beyond the immediate location of the military presence.

Social Security Hospital, El Obeid

The Social Security Hospital is a private hospital that provides medical services to members of the Social Solidarity Fund and other patients.

The documentation contains information that has not yet been independently verified, alleging that the State Governor and commander of the Fifth Infantry Division used the hospital basement as a headquarters, particularly at night, and as overnight accommodation.

The same documentation reports that the hospital was targeted several times, suffered partial destruction, and that persons accompanying patients were injured. It further reports that the hospital was closed for extended periods before reopening.

Because the alleged military use has not been verified, this case should not be presented as an established finding. It should instead be identified as an allegation requiring urgent independent investigation.

[1] Radio Dabanga “Suicide attacks target the Olympic Stadium in Al-Abyad, causing the suspension of classes at Shikan College.” September 28, 2026 https://www.dabangasudan.org/ar/all-news/article/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%85 . Accessed date November 10 2026

The case nevertheless raises particularly serious concerns because medical facilities enjoy special protection under international humanitarian law. Additional Protocol II protects medical units, and Article 13 provides general protection to civilians against the dangers arising from military operations. The ICRC also recognises that the use of a hospital for military functions, such as command and control, weapons storage, or firing positions, can amount to an act harmful to the enemy, subject to the applicable legal conditions. The fact that military personnel are alleged to be present does not, however, automatically make an attack against a hospital lawful.

Further investigation should establish the nature and duration of the alleged military use, whether military personnel or equipment were present, whether weapons were stored there, whether medical services continued, and what the attacking party knew about the facility.

Security and Intelligence Service Complex, Station 13, Al Wohda

Station 13 is described as a large complex containing offices, accommodation and sports fields. Civilian residences, commercial shops, and fuel stations surround the facility.
The documentation states that, following the dissolution of the relevant authority, the facility was handed over to the RSF and became one of its bases. It reportedly remained an RSF headquarters during the war.

The source reports that homes were destroyed, civilians were killed and injured, and residents were displaced. The exchange of fire between SAF forces inside El Obeid and RSF forces stationed at Station 13 reportedly contributed to civilian harm.

After the RSF withdrew from the city, the facility reportedly came under the control of the SAF and Security Service, and the situation reportedly improved.
The case demonstrates that the consequences of military occupation can extend across an entire neighbourhood. It also shows why investigations should examine not only individual attacks but the decision to establish and maintain military positions within populated areas.

Fifth Infantry Division and Surrounding Civilian Areas

The Fifth Infantry Division is an established military facility and therefore differs from the civilian facilities examined elsewhere in this report.
The concern in this case is the proximity of the military installation to civilian neighbourhoods.
The source material reports that on 12 June 2026 an RSF drone targeted neighbuorhoods near the division, killing 12 civilians, including a seven-year-old child and a pregnant woman, and destroying homes. On 26 July 2026, drones reportedly targeted the division, causing damage to the Agricultural Bank and the Lawyers' Club.

This case demonstrates that the presence of a lawful military objective within or near a civilian area does not make surrounding civilians lawful targets.
It also demonstrates the importance of precautions against the effects of attacks. Parties controlling military installations have an obligation to take feasible measures to reduce risks to nearby civilians, while attacking parties must assess the expected civilian harm before conducting attacks.

Um Rawaba City Court Complex

The Um Rawaba City Court Complex houses civil, criminal and Sharia courts. It is therefore a civilian institution providing an essential public service and access to justice.
[1]On 8 September 2026, the complex reportedly hosted a graduation ceremony for Fifth Infantry Division personnel and mobilised civilians. The military commander and senior commanders reportedly attended the ceremony. The source material further reports that a powerful jamming device was located inside the complex.

Later the same day, an RSF drone reportedly struck the complex, killing 13 civilians and injuring 31 others, including court employees, court police and litigants.
The case presents a particularly complex legal question because the court reportedly retained its civilian function while also being used for military activity.

The presence of military personnel or equipment does not automatically establish that the entire court complex became a military objective. Investigators must establish the nature, extent, and duration of military use, the operational significance of the reported jamming device, whether military personnel were present at the time of the attack, and what information the attacking party had concerning civilian activity at the complex.

[1] SudanTomorrow“civilians killed in a drone strike targeting the “Um Rawabacourt” stempter 8,2026 https://sudantomorrow.com/88213/?fbclid=IwY2xjawU9qtRleHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mBWJyaWQRMXppY0tNZWtkc3RmYUppRG5zcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe9sWq32sdTTV13W55uMmYnnbRUP8_gL9njHWa5TzhdYbQTG6p1cCn1FmRdgM_aem_YgE0i5ePy0MSwPtyLoBOJw Accessed date November 10, 2026.



5. International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Civilian Infrastructure

The Applicable Legal Framework

The conflict in Sudan is a non-international armed conflict. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions establishes minimum protections for persons taking no active part in hostilities.

Sudan is also a party to Additional Protocol II, which provides more detailed protections applicable to non-international armed conflicts. Article 13 establishes general protection for civilians against the dangers arising from military operations, while Article 14 protects objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.

Customary international humanitarian law also applies. The customary rules of distinction, proportionality, precautions and the protection of civilians and civilian objects are relevant to the conduct examined in this report. The ICRC's customary IHL database identifies Rules 7 to 10 concerning distinction and civilian objects, Rule 14 concerning proportionality, Rules 15 to 21 concerning precautions in attack and Rules 22 to 24 concerning precautions against the effects of attacks.

International human rights law continues to apply during armed conflict alongside international humanitarian law.

International criminal law may also become relevant where conduct satisfies the elements of recognised international crimes.

Protection of Civilians and Civilian Objects

Civilian objects are protected against attack unless and for such time as they become military objectives.

The protection applies to facilities such as schools, hospitals, homes, markets, courts and sports facilities where they retain their civilian character.

The fact that an object is located in a conflict-affected area does not itself make it a military objective.

Civilian Objects and Military Objectives

The customary definition of a military objective requires two cumulative conditions.

- First, by its nature, location, purpose or use, the object must make an effective contribution to military action.
- Second, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I contains this definition. While Additional Protocol I concerns international armed conflicts and is not the treaty framework governing Sudan's non-international armed conflict, the definition reflects the customary IHL rule concerning military objectives.

The two conditions must both be satisfied.
A civilian building does not become a military objective simply because soldiers have visited it, because military activity has occurred nearby or because a combatant lives in the vicinity.
The actual use and circumstances at the time of the attack must be examined.

The Principle of Distinction

The principle of distinction requires parties to distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.
Attacks may only be directed against military objectives.
Where a civilian facility is used for military purposes, the attacker must assess whether the object actually meets the legal criteria for a military objective.

The Principle of Proportionality

Even when an object qualifies as a military objective, an attack may be unlawful if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

The proportionality assessment must be based on the information reasonably available to the attacker at the time of the decision.

The number of civilians ultimately killed or injured is relevant evidence but does not, by itself, determine whether an attack was disproportionate.

Investigators must examine what the attacker knew, what civilian population was present, the characteristics of the target, the weapon selected, the anticipated effects and the military advantage anticipated.

Precautions in Attack

The attacking party must take feasible precautions to verify that the target is a military objective and to minimise civilian harm.

Additional Protocol I Article 57 sets out detailed precautions in attack, including the requirement to do everything feasible to verify that objectives are military objectives. Although Article 57 is treaty law applicable to international armed conflicts, many of the underlying precautionary requirements are reflected in customary IHL applicable in non-international armed conflicts.

Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks

The party controlling a military objective also has obligations to protect civilians from the effects of attacks.

Customary IHL requires parties, to the extent feasible, to remove civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives and to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.

Protection of Civilian Infrastructure in Densely Populated Areas

The risks created by militarisation are particularly acute where civilian facilities are surrounded by homes.

Al Qubba Primary School, the Olympic Stadium and Station 13 illustrate the consequences of locating military activity in civilian environments.
The presence of civilians does not automatically make a military objective unlawful, but parties must take feasible measures to reduce the risk to civilians.

Special Protection of Medical Facilities

Medical facilities receive special protection under IHL.

The alleged use of the Social Security Hospital therefore requires a heightened legal analysis.
The mere presence of military personnel near a hospital does not automatically remove its protection. The nature of the military activity, whether the hospital was being used for military purposes, whether the conduct constituted an act harmful to the enemy, and whether applicable conditions for loss of special protection were met must be established.

Protection of Schools and Educational Facilities

Schools are civilian objects and are particularly important to civilian communities because they provide education to children.

Their military use can have two consequences. First, it can deprive children of access to education. Second, it can expose the school and surrounding community to attack.
The Al Qubba case illustrates both consequences.

Protection of Objects Indispensable to Civilian Survival

Additional Protocol II Article 14 prohibits, for the purpose of starvation of civilians, attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to civilian survival, including drinking water installations and supplies.

This is particularly relevant when examining incidents involving water sources, agricultural infrastructure and other essential civilian facilities.

Prohibition of Using Civilians as Human Shields

IHL prohibits deliberately using the presence of civilians to shield military forces, equipment or military objectives from attack.

However, the mere presence of civilians around a military objective does not automatically establish the use of human shields.

Investigators should determine whether civilians were deliberately positioned or retained for the purpose of deterring attack, whether they were prevented from leaving, whether the military party knew of their presence, and whether feasible alternatives existed.



6. Legal Implications of Using Civilian Infrastructure for Military Purposes

When Does a Civilian Object Become a Military Objective?

The conversion of a civilian facility does not automatically mean that the entire facility becomes a military objective.

The assessment must be based on the actual use of the facility and the circumstances prevailing at the time.

A classroom used as an ammunition depot may be assessed differently from another classroom in the same school that remains unused for military purposes.

Similarly, a hotel room used for military accommodation may require a different assessment from an entire hotel functioning as a command centre.

This is why investigations should identify the precise part of a facility used for military purposes.

Military Headquarters and Command Centres

A facility used as a headquarters may contribute to military action depending on its function.

Investigators should establish whether orders were issued from the facility, whether military operations were planned or directed there, the level of command operating from the facility and whether destroying or neutralising the facility would provide a definite military advantage.

Weapons and Ammunition Storage in Civilian Facilities

Weapons and ammunition storage can create a strong connection between the facility and military action. It can also create significant risks for civilians.

The Al Qubba and Olympic Stadium cases demonstrate the potential consequences of secondary explosions.

Investigators should establish what weapons were stored, their quantity, their location within the facility, whether they were operationally significant, and what risks their presence created.

Military Accommodation and Training in Civilian Facilities

Accommodation and training may contribute to military action depending on their nature and circumstances. The duration, scale and purpose of the use are important.

A permanent military headquarters and accommodation centre presents a different factual situation from a temporary overnight stay.

The report should therefore avoid treating every instance of military accommodation as automatically converting the entire civilian facility into a military objective.

Military Communications and Electronic Equipment

Military communications and electronic warfare equipment can contribute directly to military operations.

In the Um Rawaba case, the alleged presence of a powerful jamming device requires further investigation to establish its nature, purpose and operational use.

The legal assessment should also establish whether the equipment was located within a civilian facility that continued to perform its ordinary civilian functions.

Military Use of Schools, Hospitals and Courts

The use of specially important civilian facilities creates additional protection concerns.
For schools, the consequences include loss of education and increased exposure to attacks.
For hospitals, the consequences may include danger to patients and medical workers and disruption of healthcare.
For courts, the consequences include disruption of access to justice and civilian administration.
The fact that a facility is used for military purposes does not eliminate the need for an incident-specific assessment.

Military Objectives in or Near Populated Areas

Parties should, to the extent feasible, avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.
This obligation is particularly important where military positions are embedded in civilian neighbourhoods.
The purpose is not to prohibit all military operations in populated areas, which may be impossible in an urban conflict, but to reduce avoidable risks to civilians.

Militarisation, Civilian Harm and Potential Criminal Responsibility

Military use of civilian infrastructure may violate IHL depending on the circumstances and may contribute to individual criminal responsibility where the conduct satisfies the elements of a recognised offence.
However, the report should not automatically classify every act of military use as a war crime.
Criminal responsibility requires identification of the relevant offense and establishment of its legal and factual elements.

The Difference Between Militarisation and a War Crime

The central distinction is therefore:

- Militarisation is a factual circumstance.
- An IHL violation is a legal conclusion based on applicable rules and evidence.
- A war crime requires the further establishment of the elements of a specific criminal offence.



7. Responsibility of the Parties to the Conflict

Responsibility of the Party Using or Converting Civilian Infrastructure

The party using civilian infrastructure for military purposes has responsibilities concerning the protection of civilians and civilian objects.

Investigators should establish whether the party:

- Used the facility for military purposes.
- Stored weapons or ammunition there.
- Used it as a headquarters or command centre.
- Accommodated military personnel there.
- Conducted training there.
- Installed communications or electronic warfare equipment there.
- Prevented civilians from leaving.
- Knew civilians remained nearby.
- Had feasible alternatives.
- Took measures to reduce civilian risks.

Responsibility for Exposing Civilians to Foreseeable Harm

The longer and more extensive the military use, the more important questions of foreseeability become.
A party maintaining an ammunition depot inside a school in a densely populated neighbourhood should reasonably understand that an attack on the depot could have consequences for surrounding civilians.
The same principle applies to the establishment of military headquarters inside civilian buildings.

Responsibility of the Attacking Party

The attacking party has an independent responsibility to determine whether the intended target is a military objective.
It cannot simply assume that a building is a lawful target because it has reportedly been used by opposing forces.
It must verify the target and consider the civilian environment.

Target Verification and Precautions

Investigators should establish:

- What information the attacking party possessed.
- How the target was identified.
- Whether the military use was confirmed.
- Whether civilians were known to be present.
- Whether the facility continued to provide civilian services.
- What weapons were used.
- Whether alternatives were available.

Proportionality and Civilian Harm

The attacker must assess foreseeable civilian harm against the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.
In cases involving ammunition storage, the assessment should include foreseeable secondary explosions.
In cases involving schools, hospitals and courts, it should also consider the civilian functions that could be disrupted

Why One Party's Violation Does Not Excuse Violations by the Other

This principle is fundamental.
If a party unlawfully uses a school as an ammunition depot, that does not automatically make every subsequent attack against the school lawful.
Conversely, if an attacker violates proportionality or precautions when attacking a militarised facility, that does not make the underlying military use lawful.
Each party's conduct must be assessed separately.

Potential Individual and Command Responsibility

Where military facilities are deliberately established inside civilian infrastructure, investigations should identify who authorised the use, who exercised command and control, who knew civilians were present, and whether commanders had the ability to relocate military activities.

For attacks, investigators should identify who planned, ordered or approved the attack and what information was available to decision makers.

The ICC has jurisdiction over the Darfur situation following the UN Security Council's referral, although Sudan is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. This means that relevant international criminal accountability mechanisms may remain important in appropriate cases, subject to jurisdictional and admissibility requirements.

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8. Impact on Civilians and Civilian Life

Deaths and Injuries

The documented incidents include significant civilian casualties.
The Um Rawaba Court Complex attack reportedly killed 13 civilians and injured 31.
The reported attack near the Fifth Infantry Division resulted in 12 civilian deaths, including a seven-year-old child and a pregnant woman.
These incidents demonstrate that militarisation can create direct risks for civilians who have no involvement in hostilities.

Destruction of Homes and Civilian Property

The Olympic Stadium attack reportedly caused damage to neighbouring homes.
The Al Qubba attack reportedly damaged several civilian houses.
The Fifth Infantry Division incidents reportedly resulted in the destruction of civilian homes.
Such destruction can cause loss of shelter, property and livelihoods and may contribute to displacement.

Displacement and Forced Movement

Militarisation can contribute to displacement even when civilians are not directly targeted.
Residents may leave because a military position has been established near their homes, because weapons are stored nearby, or because attacks become more likely.
The Al Qubba incident reportedly caused residents to leave the neighbourhood because of fear and insecurity.
Station 13 likewise reportedly experienced significant displacement following fighting around the military base.

Disruption of Education

The use of schools for military purposes directly interferes with education.
When classrooms are occupied by fighters or used to store weapons, children cannot safely use them for learning.
The conversion of Al Qubba Primary School therefore affected not only the physical security of the building but the continuity of education for children in the neighbourhood.

Disruption of Healthcare

The reported use and repeated targeting of the Social Security Hospital demonstrates the potential consequences for healthcare.
Where a hospital is damaged or closed, patients may lose access to treatment, medical workers may be displaced, and families may have to travel further to seek care.
The harm therefore extends beyond the physical structure of the hospital.

Disruption of Access to Justice

The Um Rawaba Court Complex illustrates the consequences for justice.
Courts provide more than physical space. They provide access to legal remedies, dispute resolution, and the administration of justice.
Military activities and attacks affecting court premises can interrupt these functions and leave civilians without access to essential legal services.

Damage to Essential Civilian Infrastructure

The reported impact on Shikan Medical College, Agricultural Bank, Lawyers' Club and other civilian institutions demonstrates how attacks around military positions can affect infrastructure beyond the immediate military objective.
The impact may include damage to buildings, interruption of services and loss of public confidence.

Fear, Insecurity and the Breakdown of Civilian Life

The psychological impact of explosions, drone attacks and the presence of military personnel within civilian neighbourhoods should also be documented.
Fear can alter movement, access to schools, use of markets and willingness to remain in homes.
The source material repeatedly refers to panic and fear following attacks on Al Qubba School and the Olympic Stadium.

Wider Humanitarian Consequences

The cumulative effect of militarisation may include displacement, loss of livelihoods, interruption of education, reduced healthcare access, disruption of justice and deterioration of community safety.
The consequences may continue long after the immediate attack.



9. Accountability and Documentation Priorities

Establishing the Original Civilian Status of a Facility

Investigators should establish what the facility was originally used for and whether it was functioning as a civilian institution before military use began.
This may require documents, photographs, interviews, satellite imagery, and records from local authorities.

Establishing the Nature and Duration of Military Use

Documentation should establish:

- When military use began.
- Who took control.
- What activities occurred.
- Whether weapons were stored.
- Whether personnel were accommodated.
- Whether command functions were conducted.
- Whether communications equipment was installed.
- Whether the use was temporary or permanent.

Identifying Responsible Actors

The responsible armed group or military force should be identified through witness testimony, visual evidence, command structures, uniforms, insignia, communications, and other available evidence.

Documenting the Presence and Proximity of Civilians

Investigators should map surrounding homes, schools, hospitals, markets and other civilian facilities.
They should document how many civilians lived or worked nearby and whether civilians remained inside the facility.

Establishing the Attacker's Knowledge and Available Information

For attacks, investigators should establish what the attacker knew about:

- The facility.
- Its military use.
- The surrounding civilian population.
- The continued civilian function of the building.
- The foreseeable consequences of the chosen means and method of attack.

Evidence of Weapons, Military Equipment and Command Structures

Evidence should be gathered concerning weapons depots, ammunition, military vehicles, communications systems, command offices and accommodation areas.
The exact location of military assets within civilian facilities should be established wherever possible.

Documenting Civilian Harm and Damage

Documentation should include:

- Deaths and injuries.
- Damage to homes.
- Damage to schools.
- Damage to hospitals.
- Damage to courts.
- Damage to markets and businesses.
- Displacement.
- Loss of livelihoods.
- Closure of services.
- and other consequences.

Impact on Civilians

Open Source, Satellite and Geospatial Evidence

Satellite imagery can assist in establishing changes in the physical use of a facility over time.
Photographs and videos can help establish the presence of military personnel, weapons and vehicles.
Geolocation can establish the relationship between a military site and surrounding civilian infrastructure.

Survivor and Witness Testimonies

Interviews should seek information concerning:

- When military forces arrived.
- What they did.
- Whether civilians were ordered to leave.
- Whether weapons were brought into the facility.
- Whether soldiers lived there.
- Whether military commanders operated there.
- Whether civilians were prevented from leaving.
- What happened during and after attacks.

Command Responsibility and Patterns of Conduct

Investigations should identify the individuals who ordered or authorised the conversion of civilian infrastructure.
They should also establish whether commanders knew civilians were present and whether they had feasible alternatives.
For attacks, investigations should identify who authorised the operation, what intelligence was available and what precautions were considered.
The repeated use of similar types of civilian infrastructure may also provide evidence of broader patterns of conduct, although each incident should continue to be assessed on its own facts.



10. Conclusion

The evidence reviewed for this report indicates a concerning pattern of civilian infrastructure being incorporated into military activities in North Kordofan through occupation, conversion and military use.

The documented cases include the reported use of a school as a headquarters, soldier accommodation and weapons depot; the use of a sports stadium as a military headquarters, accommodation facility and weapons storage site; the reported accommodation of senior commanders in a civilian hotel; an unverified allegation concerning the use of a hospital by senior military officials; the use of Station 13 as a military base; military activity within a civilian court complex; and military operations taking place in or near civilian neighbourhoods surrounding the Fifth Infantry Division.
The evidence indicates that this pattern was already documented by 2025 and continued through 2026.

The consequences for civilians have been significant. Reported deaths, injuries, destruction of homes, displacement, fear and disruption of education, healthcare and justice demonstrate that the impact of militarisation extends beyond the physical boundaries of the facilities being used.

The legal assessment must nevertheless remain precise.
The military use of a civilian facility does not automatically constitute a war crime. Similarly, the subsequent attack against a militarised civilian facility is not automatically lawful.

Where a civilian object is used in a manner that satisfies the customary criteria for a military objective, it may lose protection from attack for such time as those conditions exist. But the attacking party remains bound by distinction, proportionality and precautions.

At the same time, parties controlling military objectives have obligations to protect civilians and civilian objects and, to the extent feasible, to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.

The protection of civilians therefore requires accountability for the conduct of both sides.
The party that converts civilian infrastructure into a military facility should be investigated for whether it exposed civilians to foreseeable harm, failed to take feasible precautions or deliberately used civilians to shield military objectives.

The attacking party should be investigated for whether it correctly identified the target, assessed the civilian environment, selected appropriate means and methods, took feasible precautions and ensured that expected civilian harm was not excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.

The evidence also demonstrates the importance of documenting civilian infrastructure before, during, and after militarization. Without such documentation, it may be difficult to establish the original civilian status of a facility, when its status changed, who was responsible, and what each party knew at the time of an attack.

The cases examined in this report provide an important basis for further investigation into the militarisation of civilian infrastructure and its consequences for civilians in North Kordofan. Further research is necessary to establish the full extent of these practices, identify those responsible, and determine whether similar patterns exist



11. Recommendations

Drawing on the findings of this report and the applicable international humanitarian law framework, the Sudanese Alliance for Rights (SAR) calls on the parties to the conflict, relevant Sudanese authorities, regional and international actors, and accountability mechanisms to take urgent and coordinated action to protect civilians, prevent the military use of civilian infrastructure, investigate reported violations and ensure accountability for those responsible. The following recommendations outline the measures required to strengthen civilian protection and advance accountability in North Kordofan.

To the Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces and Affiliated Armed Groups

The parties to the conflict should immediately cease using civilian infrastructure for military purposes wherever feasible, particularly schools, hospitals, courts and other facilities providing essential civilian services.

Military personnel, weapons, ammunition and military equipment should be removed from civilian facilities wherever feasible.

Military headquarters, ammunition depots and other military objectives should not be established within or near densely populated areas where alternative locations are feasible.

Parties should take feasible measures to protect civilians living near existing military objectives and should remove civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives under their control wherever feasible.

Parties should not deliberately use civilian presence or civilian infrastructure to shield military objectives from attack.

Parties should ensure that civilians are not unlawfully prevented from leaving areas in which military objectives have been established.

To Parties Conducting Attacks

All alleged military objectives located within civilian infrastructure should be subjected to rigorous target verification before an attack.
Attacking forces should assess the nature and extent of military use and determine whether the object satisfies the legal criteria for a military objective at the time of the attack.

They should assess the presence and proximity of civilians and civilian objects and consider foreseeable secondary effects, particularly where weapons or ammunition are stored inside civilian facilities.

Attacking forces should take all feasible precautions to minimise civilian harm.
Particular care should be taken where the target is located within or near schools, hospitals, courts, residential buildings or other facilities providing essential civilian services.

Attacks should be cancelled or suspended where it becomes apparent that the expected civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

To African and International Accountability Mechanisms

Investigations into violations committed during Sudan's armed conflict should examine the militarisation of civilian infrastructure as a distinct component of the factual circumstances surrounding attacks against civilians.

Investigators should establish the original civilian function of facilities, the date and nature of military conversion, the party responsible, the military purpose, the duration of use, the presence of civilians and the precautions taken by both parties.

Investigations should examine command structures and identify individuals responsible for authorising, directing or maintaining military use of civilian facilities.

Investigations should also assess whether the conduct meets the elements of specific violations or international crimes rather than automatically categorising every instance of military use as a war crime.

To Civil Society and Documentation Organisations

Civil society organisations should strengthen systematic documentation of civilian infrastructure used for military purposes.

Incident files should preserve evidence concerning both the militarisation of the facility and any subsequent attack.

Documentation should include witness testimony, photographs, videos, satellite imagery, geolocation information, medical records, evidence of civilian casualties and evidence establishing military use.

Organisations should document the original civilian function of facilities before recording subsequent military use.

Where allegations cannot yet be independently verified, they should be clearly identified as allegations and subjected to further corroboration.

Documentation should also preserve evidence concerning command structures and individuals who authorised or maintained military use.

To Humanitarian Actors

Humanitarian actors should continue advocating for the protection of civilian infrastructure and essential civilian services.

Particular attention should be given to hospitals, schools, water facilities, courts, food distribution points and other infrastructure whose destruction or disruption may have consequences extending beyond the immediate site.

Where military use of civilian infrastructure places civilians at heightened risk, humanitarian actors should raise protection concerns with relevant parties and accountability mechanisms, subject to operational and security considerations.

To National and International Documentation and Accountability Efforts

A common documentation framework should be developed for cases involving the militarisation of civilian infrastructure.

The framework should record the original civilian function, nature and duration of military use, responsible party, location of civilians, proximity to other civilian infrastructure, weapons and equipment present, command structures, attack circumstances, civilian harm and available evidence.

This would allow incidents from different parts of Sudan to be compared and may help establish broader patterns of conduct.

Annex I: Timeline of Documented Incidents

Date/Period	Facility/Location	Reported Military Use	Reported Incident/Impact
Beginning of 2025	Al Qubba Primary School, El Obeid	Headquarters, soldier accommodation, weapons and ammunition storage	School reportedly militarised
September 2025	Al Qubba Primary School	Weapons and ammunition depot	RSF drone reportedly struck depot; explosions damaged civilian homes; residents reportedly left
Around 2025 or earlier	Olympic Stadium, El Obeid	Joint Forces headquarters, accommodation, military activities, weapons and ammunition storage	Military use reportedly continued for more than one and a half years
12 August 2026	Al Qadaya Hotel and surrounding area	Senior Joint Forces commanders reportedly accommodated in hotel	RSF drone attack reportedly killed civilians and disrupted judicial, educational and market activities
2026	Social Hospital	Security alleged use of basement as military headquarters and accommodation	Information remains unverified; hospital reportedly targeted and partially damaged
2026	Station 13, Wohda	RSF military base and headquarters	Fighting reportedly caused civilian deaths, injuries, destruction of homes and displacement
12 June 2026	Areas near Fifth Infantry Division	Established military facility near civilian neighbourhoods	RSF drone reportedly killed 12 civilians and destroyed homes
26 July 2026	Fifth Infantry Division area	Established military facility	Agricultural Bank and Lawyers' Club reportedly damaged
8 September 2026	Um Rawaba City Court Complex	Military graduation ceremony; reported military communications/jamming equipment	RSF drone reportedly killed 13 civilians and injured 31
28 September 2026	Olympic Stadium, El Obeid	Joint Forces headquarters and secondary weapons storage	RSF struck weapons depot; secondary explosions damaged homes and Shikan Medical College

Annex II: Summary of Documented Civilian Facilities and Military Uses

Olympic Stadium

Original Civilian Function:
Sports facility and youth training centre.

Reported Military Use:
Joint Forces headquarters, military accommodation, military activities, and weapons and ammunition storage.

Civilian Environment:
Residential neighbourhoods and Shikan Medical College.

Reported Impact:
Secondary explosions, damage to homes and partial damage to Shikan Medical College; fear and panic.

Verification Status:
Reported and supported by identified source material.

Al Qadaiya Hotel

Original Civilian Function:
Judicial Authority investment and civilian hotel facility.

Reported Military Use:
Semi-permanent accommodation for senior Joint Forces commanders.

Civilian Environment:
Near courts, banks, businesses, and other civilian facilities.

Reported Impact:
Death of a civilian woman and a Judicial Authority employee following a nearby drone attack; suspension of judicial activities, school closures, and market disruption.

Verification Status:
Reported.

Station 13

Original Civilian Function:
Security and Intelligence Service complex.

Reported Military Use:
RSF military base and headquarters.

Civilian Environment:
Surrounded by homes, businesses, and fuel stations.

Reported Impact:
Deaths, injuries, destruction of homes, and displacement.

Verification Status:
Reported.

Um Rawaba City Court Complex

Original Civilian Function:
Civil, criminal, and Sharia courts.

Reported Military Use:
Military graduation ceremony and reported presence of military communications/jamming equipment.

Civilian Environment:
Active judicial institution serving civilians.

Reported Impact:
13 civilians reportedly killed and 31 injured.

Verification Status:
Reported; nature and extent of military use require further investigation.

Al Qubba Primary School

Original Civilian Function:
Primary education.

Reported Military Use:
Headquarters, soldier accommodation, and weapons and ammunition storage.

Civilian Environment:
Residential neighbourhood.

Reported Impact:
Explosions, damage to civilian homes, fear and displacement.

Verification Status:
Reported and supported by identified source material.

Social Security Hospital

Original Civilian Function:
Civilian healthcare facility

Reported Military Use:
Alleged use of the basement by senior military officials as headquarters and overnight accommodation.

Civilian Environment:
Medical and civilian area.

Reported Impact:
Partial damage, reported injuries to persons accompanying patients and temporary closure.

Verification Status:
Unverified allegation requiring further investigation.

Fifth Infantry Division

Original Civilian Function:
Military facility.

Reported Military Use:
Established military objective.

Civilian Environment:
Located close to civilian neighbourhoods and civilian institutions.

Reported Impact:
Civilian deaths, destruction of homes, and damage to civilian institutions following attacks in the surrounding area.

Verification Status:
Reported.

Annex III: Applicable International Humanitarian Law Provisions

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions: Provides minimum protections for persons taking no active part in hostilities in non-international armed conflicts.
Additional Protocol II, Article 13: Provides general protection to civilians against the dangers arising from military operations.
Additional Protocol II, Article 14: Protects objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, including drinking water installations and supplies, against being attacked, destroyed, removed, or rendered useless for the purpose of starving civilians.
Customary IHL Rule 7: Establishes the principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives.
Customary IHL Rule 8: Defines military objectives.
Customary IHL Rule 9: Defines civilian objects.
Customary IHL Rule 10: Establishes that civilian objects lose protection against attack only for such time as they become military objectives.
Customary IHL Rule 14: Prohibits attacks expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Customary IHL Rules 15–21: Establish precautionary obligations concerning attacks, including target verification, choice of means and methods, assessment of effects and target selection.
Customary IHL Rule 23: Requires parties, to the extent feasible, to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.
Customary IHL Rule 24: Requires parties, to the extent feasible, to remove civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives.
Customary IHL Rule 97: Prohibits the use of human shields.
Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I: Provides the widely accepted definition of military objectives. In the context of Sudan's non-international armed conflict, the definition is relevant as an expression of customary international humanitarian law rather than as a treaty provision directly applicable to Sudan as a party to Additional Protocol I.
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I: Sets out detailed precautions in attack, including target verification and the requirement to take constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects. Its underlying precautionary principles are also reflected in customary IHL applicable to non-international armed conflicts.

International criminal law: Where conduct satisfies the elements of a recognised international crime, including a war crime, individual criminal responsibility may arise. The ICC's Darfur situation was referred by the UN Security Council in 2005 and remains subject to ICC jurisdiction within the scope established by that referral.

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